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Vortrag von Martin Weibelzahl im MODUS-Oberseminar: „Applying multi-level optimization techniques to aviation and electricity markets“

Mittwoch, den 8. Dezember 2021

Am Mittwoch, dem 8. Dezember 2021, um 12:15 Uhr spricht in einer Zoom-Konferenz

Dr. Martin Weibelzahl
Fachbereichsleiter am Kernkompetenzzentrum Finanz- & Informationsmanagement (FIM)
und der Projektgruppe Wirtschaftsinformatik
des Fraunhofer-Instituts für Angewandte Informationstechnik (FIT), Bayreuth

im Rahmen des

Forschungszentrums für Modellierung und Simulation (MODUS).

über das Thema

„Applying multi-level optimization techniques to aviation and electricity markets“.

Weitere Einzelheiten erfahren Sie im eLearning-Kurs (Vortragsankündigungen, Diskussionen, ...) des MODUS-Forschungszentrums.

Dort stehen auch die konkreten Einwahldaten zur Videokonferenz.


In my talk, I will present two applications of modern multi-level optimization to the design of aviation and electricity markets:
With respect to electricity markets, the rapid growth of the share of energy generated via renewable sources highly challenges grid stability. Flexibility is key to balance the electricity supply and demand. As a relatively new player in the energy market, the Energy Storage System (ESS) is capable of providing such flexibility, acting as both a consumer and producer. Since the Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European Union requires ESSs to be operated by an independent market player, ESSs are becoming an important player in different electricity markets. Crucially, it is difficult for, e.g., market-monitoring authorities, to compare the bid cost functions to the true opportunity costs of an ESS. Motivated by this, in this paper we elaborate on the potential of an ESS to exercise market power in a liberalized electricity market. In particular, we analyze how a monopolistic ESS operator may influence short-run market outcomes, e.g., prices and system costs, depending on different market designs including a nodal, a zonal, and a uniform pricing system. For this purpose, we propose a four-stage Stackelberg game where the monopolistic ESS operator first decides on its day-ahead market bids (level 1), followed by day-ahead market clearing (level 2), after which the ESS submits bids to the real-time balancing market (level 3), which is then cleared (level 4). Relying on a widely used case study, we illustrate that some market designs may be more favorable for the ESS operator, whereas other ones may be more attractive from the regulator’s point of view of minimizing the overall system costs.
With respect to aviation markets, we present a market model of a liberalized aviation market with independent decision makers. The model consists of a hierarchical, trilevel optimization problem where perfectly competitive budget-constrained airports decide (in the first level) on optimal runway capacity extensions and airport charges by anticipating long-term fleet investment and medium-term aircraft scheduling decisions taken by a set of imperfectly competitive airlines (in the second level). Both airports and airlines anticipate the short-term outcome of a perfectly competitive ticket market (in the third level). We compare our trilevel model to an integrated single-level (benchmark) model in which investments, scheduling, and market-clearing decisions are simultaneously taken by a welfare-maximizing social planner. Using a simple six airports example from the literature, we illustrate the inefficiency of long-run investments in both runway capacity and aircraft fleet which may be observed in aviation markets with imperfectly competitive airlines.
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