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In this talk, I will present an example of how digital and computational methods are currently applied in philosophy. Group deliberation plays an important role in theories of collective decision-making and political legitimacy. It has been argued, for instance, that well-ordered deliberation embodies democratic values like equal participation and responsiveness to others, and that it can help groups to make coherent or even accurate decisions. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that real-world deliberation often falls short of these ideals, being prone to various kinds of unfair biases and even to increasing political polarization. These findings raise important philosophical questions: Given its shortcomings, can group deliberation still be seen as embodying democratic ideals, or as leading to good group decisions? Are these shortcomings due to our own cognitive limitations and biases, or are they structural features of deliberative processes? In this talk I will present findings from computational simulations that suggest that three salient negative effects – incoherent group preferences, path dependence, and polarization – are indeed structural features of deliberative processes that can occur even among rational agents deliberating in idealized conditions. These findings force us to reconsider the role that deliberation has been playing in political theory, but at the same time suggest concrete measures to improve deliberative processes.

The results that I will present have been obtained in collaboration with Soroush Rafiee Rad (UvA, Amsterdam), Paolo Galeazzi (Philosophy, Bayreuth), Sebastian Braun (Economics, Bayreuth), and Maher Abou Zeid (European Commission).